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Implied, Resulting or Constructive
Trust?
B. H. Davis*
In the past two or three decades, there has arisen "a new field of discord liable
to explode into litigation. It arises whenever parties either within or without the
bonds of matrimony have lived in a home owned by one, and the other has
contributed to its acquisition, its maintenance, its equipment with furniture or the
running expenses of the household and their relationship has been dissolved
without any clear agreement as to their property rights."l Given that the courts
emphasise the need to adhere to established property rights, they have, in order to
establish those rights in the "new fields of discord", which indeed has exploded
into litigation, had recourse, in the absence of precise statutory provisions, to the
doctrines of Equity. The result seems to have been the creation of a new class of
trusts, developed from, but distinct from these concepts, or at least not entirely
coincident with them.
"Equity is not past the age of child-bearing. One of her latest progeny is a
constructive trust of a new model,,2
or as Glass JA expressed it, perhaps more cautiously, in Allen v. Snyder:
"New situations have, it appears, produced some new legal rules. It is
inevitable that judge made law will alter to meet the changing conditions of
society. That is the way it has alwaysevolved. But it is essential that new rules
should be related to fundamental doctrine. If the foundations of accepted
doctrine be submerged under new principles without regard to the interaction
between the two, there will be high uncertainty as to the state of the law, both
old and new. So it seems to me that a construction of the new rules which can
accommodate them within the old structure is to be preferred to one which
does not.,,3
The purpose of this article is to examine this new manifestation in the light of
established fundamental doctrine to consider how far, if at all, it derives from or
·Senior Lecturer in Law, Victoria University of Wellington
1.Allm v. Snyder (1977) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 685, per Glass JA.
2. Eves v. Eves [1975] 3 All E.R. 768, 771 per Lord Denning MR, although, of course, as Bagnall J
opined in Cowcher v. Cowcher [1972] 1W.L.R. 425, 430, the progeny must be legitimate.
3. (1977) 2 N.S.w.L.R. 685, 689 per Glass JA.
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can be accommodated within the traditional framework; whether it is merely an
extension of existing concepts, identifiable as such or, as it may appear, a rather
new concept which borrows from, inter alia, each of the trust concepts, the
resulting and constructive trust. Simply, the purpose here is to seek to find the real
nature of the new trust, by discovering its relation to fundamental doctrine; its
accommodation within old structures.
The problem of identity
There does seem to be some judicial uncertainty as to the most appropriate
structural basis. So, for the moment, for want of any better description, the new
trust may be called, in Lord Denning's phrase, "a constructive trust of a new
model". This is simply a term of convenience, and is not to be taken as implying
either that the term is accurate, or that the criticism of what Lord Denning has
proceeded to do in the guise of the new model constructive trust is unfounded. As
Glass JA stated in Allen v. Snyder: "There is a problem of no inconsiderable
dimensions in determining what is the nature of the trust to which the courts give
effect upon proof of such an agreement or common intention ... Is it a new kind
of constructive trust, an express trust or a resulting trust?,,4Acknowledging, as did
Glass JA, that this is a problem of no inconsiderable dimensions, it is intended
here, in no doubt a somewhat slight way, to seek a solution to the problem which
may have contributed in no small measure to the sense of confusion which appears
to surround the post-Gissing v. Gissing trust.
Certainly the courts have been rather liberal in their use of descriptive
classification often calling it constructive trust but occasionally resulting.5 While
also, there have been judicial observations that the name is irrelevant. Thus, Lord
Diplock's famous observation in Gissing v. Gissing begins with the words: "A
resulting, implied or constructive trust - and it is unnecessary for present purposes
to distinguish between these three classes of trust ... ".6 Similarly in the judgment
of Fox LJ in Burns v. Burns, there occurs the sentence: "Whether the trust which
would arise in such circumstances is described as implied, constructive or
resulting does not greatly matter."? Even Lord Denning, whose development of
the doctrine has been much criticised, expressed the same uncertainty: "Although
the plaintiff alleged that there was a resulting trust, I should have thought that the
trust in this case, if there was one, was more in the nature of a constructive trust:
but this is more a matter of words than anything else. The two run together.,,8 The
result may be that the already fine lines between the various accepted classes of
4. Ibid., at p.691.
5. E.g., Burns v. Burns [1984] 1 Ch. 317, 326, 336; and Cowcherv. Cowcher [1972] 1W.L.R. 425, 432.
6. [1971] A.C. 886, 905.
7. [1984] 1 Ch. 317,326.
8. Hussey v. Palmer [1972] 1W.L.R. 1286, 1289.
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trust are blurred and the way is open for a judicial free-for-all, possibly at a
litigant's exj>ense.9
The views of American courts will be considered later in the article, but it is
pertinent to note the remark of Smith J in Page v. Clark: 10
"One major problem is that the point of viewtaken, or the time frame chosen,
by a court for scrutinising a given fact situation will likely determine the label
that is eventually applied ... The same fact situation which give~rise to a
resulting trust may also legitimately be labelled one which justifies a
constructive trust, if the court chooses to concentrate on an injustice - a
broken fiduciary relationship or the like which arose after the original vesting
of title, even though the court might decide to relate the wronging back to the
date of the transaction. Occasionally a court has conspicuously woven both
approaches into one opinion."
And that can hardly be satisfactory if the law is to retain a semblance of
certainty. One manifestation of the free-for-all will now be noted, with the
criticism which has been levelled at it, and the subsequent reaction.
The new model constructive trust - a wide trust?
The acknowledged point of departure of the new trust seems to be the decision
of the House of Lords in Gissing v. Gissing and in particular the much quoted
dictum of Lo~d Diplock:
"A resulting, implied or constructive trust - and it is unnecessary for present
purposes to distinguish between these three classes of trust - is created by a
transaction between the trustee and the cestui que trust in connection with th.e
acquisition by the trustee of a legal estate in land, whenever the trustee has so
conducted himself that it would be inequitable to allow him to deny to the
cestui que trust a beneficial interest in the land acquired. And he will be held so
to have conducted himself if by his words or conduct he has induced the cestui
que trust to act to his own detriment in the reasonable belief that by so acting
he was acquiring a beneficial interest in the land."ll
This is a dictum of some width, and therefore perhaps rather apt to be taken out
of context, but its very breadth seems to have attracted the later Court of Appeal in
England, and in particular Lord Denning. Thus in Cooke v.Head, for example, he
observed: "It is now held that, whenever two parties by their joint efforts acquire
property to be used for their joint benefit, the courts may impose or impute a
constructive or resulting truSt.,,12 Likewise in Hall v. Hall, he expressed the
9. See, e.g., Cowcher v. Cowcher, supra, n.5, at p.430 per Bagnall J: "Otherwise, no lawyer could safely
advise on a client's tide and every quarrel would lead to a lawsuit."
10.572 P.2d. 1214 (1977), per Smith J at p.l217.
11. [1971] A.C. 886, 905.
12. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 518, 520.
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doctrine in the following terms: "If a man and a woman have been living together
as husband and wife, and the woman has been contributing towards the
establishment of the joint household, although the house is in the man's name,
there is a resulting trust as a matter of common justice for her.,,13
In Hussey v. Palmer Lord Denning appears to have extended the same doctrine
beyond the familiar situation by stating a much wider basis for the new model
trust:
"By whatever name it is described, it is a trust imposed by law whenever
justice and good conscience require it. It is a liberal process, founded upon
large principles of equity, to be applied in cases where the defendant cannot
conscientiously keep the property for himself alone, but ought to allow
another to have the property or a share in it ... It is an equitable remedy by
which the court can enable an aggrieved party to obtain restitution."l4
However, this approach, though recently embraced,15 has been generally
castigated as too broad, indeed a perversion of the principles of equity, designed to
do no more than justifYthe individual judge's ideas of "common justice". Thus,
Mahon], perhaps New Zealand's principal antagonist to the Denning approach,
lambasted the application of this new approach expressed inHussey v.Palmer in no
uncertain terms:
"I must say that on the facts of this case I think I am being asked to apply a
supposed rule of equity which is not only vague in its outline but which must
disqualify itself from acceptance as a valid principle of jurisprudence by its
total uncertainty of application and result. It cannot be sufficient to say that
wide and varying notions of fairness and conscience shall be the legal
determinant. No stable system of jurisprudence could permit a litigant's claim
to justice to be consigned to the formless void of individual moral opinion."l6
Similar criticism of the Denning approach has been stated by academic writers:
"Unfortunately the views of the Courts in these cases [Gissing and Pettitt] have
been exploited (particularly by Lord Denning) to attain unjustifiable ends which
have led to confusion in the meaning to be attributed to the terms 'resulting' and
'constructive' trustS."l7 Reacting, perhaps, to such criticism, the courts have
sought to narrow the doctrine of the new model constructive trust to within
recognisable limits, and to relate its scope within specific criteria though not,
perhaps, identical with established forms of resulting and constructive trust.
13. [1982] 3 F.L.R. 379, 381.
14. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1286, 1289-90.
15. See, e.g., the observations of Cooke J in Hayward v. Giordani [1983] N.Z.L.R. 141, and see
Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 87-88 per Toohey J
16. Carly v. Farrelly [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 356, 367; and see also Avondale Printers and Stationers Ltd. v.
Haggie [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 124, 154; SuI/ivan v. Evans (1985) 3 N.Z.L.R. 449, 453 per Hardie BoysJ
17.J.Maxton, Nevil/'s Law of Trusts, Wills andAdministration in New Zealand (1985), pp.58-59. See also
Meagher, Gummow, and Lehane, Equity-Doarines and Remedies, 2nd Ed. (1984), p.69.
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The new model constructive trust - narrow form
The context of Gissing v. Gissing suggests that the introductory dictum of Lord
Diplock is phrased rather too widely, that what that decision expresses is a much
narrower doctrine of trust. The tenor of the speeches of the majority in that case,
including that of Lord Diplock, is to the effect that rather than seeking to do some
sort of pure justice, the courts ought to be givingeffect to the agreement, whether
express or inferred from their conduct, which the parties had for the distribution
of property; that is to say that common intention construed from the
circumstances.
"Where there was a common intention at the time of the acquisition of the
house that the beneficial interest in it should be shared, it would be a breach
of faith by the spouse in whose name the legal estate was vested to fail to give
effect to that intention, and the other spouse will be held entitled to a share in
the beneficial interest. The difficulty where the dispute is between former
spouses arises with regard to proof of the existence of any such common
intention ... If the wife provided part of the purchase price of the house,
either initially or subsequently by paying or sharing in the mortgage
payments, the inference maywell arise that it was the common intention that
she should have an interest in the house.,,18
It is therefore established that by whatever name the trust may be called, it is
based entirely on notions of common intention, and some direct or indirect
contribution to the acquisition or maintenance of the property, which can be
regarded as a substantial contribution. As Cooke J said in Hayward v. Giordani: 19
"Since Pettitt v. Pettitt and Gissing v. Gissing it has been orthodox doctrine that
when substantial capital contributions have been made to the acquisition or the
improvement of a property, and where a common interest of shared beneficial
ownership can be inferred, the Court may hold a trust of an appropriate share to
exist. It is immaterial that the legal title may be in the name of one party only.,,19
The element in the new model trust in its narrow form can now perhaps be
summarised in three heads:-
(i) the nature of the common intention
(ii) the nature of the contribution
(iii) the time for forming that intention
(i) The nature of the common intention
The common intention may be expressed as a written or oral agreement, or may
be inferred from conduct even though it has been no more than a belief, and not
directly communicated. Whether or not there is such common intention is
essentially a matter of evidence, but the courts merely give effect to an intention
18. [1971] A.C. 886, 890 per Viscount Dilhorne.
19. [1983] N.Z.L.R. 141, 143-4.
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which is established, and are not at liberty to impute to them an intention they
might have had if they had applied their minds to the question. The intention,
therefore, comes from the parties, and not from the courts, or notions of justice:
and the intention must be supported by a consideration, in the form of
contribution or some detriment in order to be enforceable and not merely a
voluntary declaration of trust. 20
(ii) The nature of the contribution
The common intention maybe inferred from conduct, but essentially that seems
to mean from some contribution direct or indirect referable to the payment for the
property, and may include payments of or towards the deposit, the mortgage
repayments, the furniture, or household expenditure. But the payment must be
substantial, and not de minimis,21 and in connection with the household
expenditure this must amount to a degree of thrift which allows the other party to
make property related payments more easily, or as Lord Denning put it "more
than most wives would do", or at least more than ordinary domestic tasks.22
Despite the contrary view taken by Lord Denning in Hall v. Hall and now
enacted in such legislation as the Matrimonial Property Act 1975 (NZ),23 that: "It
depends on the circumstances and how much she has contributed not merely in
money but also in keeping up the house and, if there are children, in looking after
them";24 the courts are reverting towards the attitude expressed by Lord Diplock
in Pettitt v. Pettitt:
"If the husband likes to occupy his leisure by laying a new lawn in the garden
or building a fitted wardrobe in the bedroom, while the wife does the
shopping, cooks the dinner and bathes the children, I, for my part, find it
quite impossible to impute to them as reasonable husband and wife any
common intention that their domestic activities or any of them are to have any
effect upon the existing proprietory rights in the family home ... ,,25
20. Austin v. Keele (1987) 72 A.L.R. 579, 587 (P.C).
21. Young v. Youllg [1984] F.L.R. 375.
22. Nemeth v. Nemeth (1977) 17 A.L.R. 500; Sullivan v. Evans (1985) 3 N.Z.L.R. 449.
23. This Act provides generally, that husband and wife will share equally in the matrimonial home, and
applies the same principle to other matrimonial property except where "his or her contribution to the
marriage partnership has been clearly greater than that of the other spouse." Such contributions may
also be of importance in determining shares in the matrimonial home itself in cases of marriages of
short duration: sections 11,13,15. Contributions to marriage partnership are widely defined and
include, inter alia, not only financial contribution but also the care of dependants, and the
"management of the household and the performance of household duties." (s.18); see Hayward v.
Giordani [1983] N.Z.L.R. 141, 145.
24. (1982) 3 F.L.R. 379.
25. [1970] A.C. 777, 826. See also the observation of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest at p.805: "I do not
think that the mere circumstance taken by itself that one spouse does work of renovation to a house
belonging to the other spouse has the result that some beneficial interest in the house is acquired by the
former."
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This view was applied by the Court of Appeal in Burns v. Burns, when Fox LJ
stated: "But the mere fact that parties live together and do the ordinary domestic
tasks is, in my view, no indication at all that they thereby intended to alter the
exisiting property rights of either of them.,,26
(iii) The time for fonning the intention
The clear picture which has emerged is that the contribution must be clearly,
even if indirectly, related to the property, and this is so whether the analogy of
unjust enrichment or proprietory estoppel is taken as the philosophical basis of the
new trust. It must almost follow that the common intention finds expression in a
contemplation that the parties contribute in accordance with a possibly tacit and
unspoken agreement and belief at the time the property was acquired. In other
words that the property was acquired on the basis that the contribution would in
fact be made. Prima facie, therefore, the intenJ must exist at the outset, though it
seems also to be recognised that the common' intention may be formed at a later
stage and either referred back to the original acquisition or to improvements later
undertaken, as the family circumstances alter__27
Such then are the criteria, in brief, of the new trust. In its development, which
perhaps began as long ago as 1952, in the case of Rimmerv. Rimme,zs it has taken
many turns, once treated widely, now more narrowly. Without a doubt it is related
to the structure of other trusts. The notion that there must be a contribution seems
to derive from traditional resulting trusts, though constituted on a wider footing.
On the other hand, the shadow of the doctrine of proprietory estoppel, that a
person has expended money or suffered a detriment in reliance upon a belief
which has been fostered expressly or tacitly by the title owner, seems to underlie
the new trust, and indeed has recently been suggested as a fruitful analogy for
development. 29
Alternatively, the overall approach may suggest the kind of fraud found in the
constructive trust of the Bannister v. Bannister type - that of backing out of an
agreement or undertaking for which valuable consideration has been given. In this
way it perhaps comes close to the express trust employed in Rochefoucauld v.
Boustead which decision was clearly influential on the Court of Appeal in Bannister.
Thus the trust contains elements of the more traditional trust absorbing its
elements. However there remains the question raised by Glass JA in Allen v.
Snyder. "Is it a new kind of constructive trust, an express trust or a resulting
trust?,,30
26. [1984] 1 Ch. 317, 331: in the same case, Nourse LJ said: "In my judgment it must be conduct on
which the woman could not reasonably have been expected to embark unless she was to have an interest
in the house."
27. Pettitt v. Pettitt [1970] A.C. 777, per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest; Bernard v.Josephs [1982] 1 Ch.
391, 404 per Griffiths LJ.
28. [1953] 1 QB. 63.
29. E.g., Grant v. Edwards [1986] 1 Ch. 638, per Browne-Wilkinson Vc.
30. (1977) 2 N.S.W.L.R. 685, 691.
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The New Zealand approach
In the main, the New Zealand Courts3! have generally been content to follow
the narrower approach of establishing from the circumstances, if at all, the
common intention of the parties and givingeffect to that intention or agreement,32
and so to eschew the wider approach of Lord Denning. Indeed, as will already
have become apparent, there has been strong judicial criticism of Lord Denning's
doctrines in New Zealand. The basic application of the common approach in New
Zealand can be illustrated byBuddie v. Russe1l33where a couple living together in a
defaao relationship jointly purchased a house which was vested in the name of the
woman. The purchase was financed partly from their joint savings and by a loan
from her parents, but mainly by means of a mortgage. Heron J observed in the
course of the judgment:
"I am not of the view that these two parties were proceeding along different
tracks, mistaken as to the intention of one another, and I am of the clear view
that at the time the transaction was entered into, the bank arrangements made
and the property settled, both parties intended that this house was being
purchased for them both.,,34
On the other hand, the New Zealand Courts have shown some inclination to
find that, in the absence of a common intention, some other doctrine of Equity
might still be called on: thus in Beech v. Beech and J. N Elliott and Co Ltd v.
Murgatroyd,36 where the courts found insufficient evidence of a common intention
so as to establish a trust, they held that there was nonetheless sufficient to allow the
claimant an interest, in the one case of a freehold, in the other a licence, based on
the doctrine of proprietory estoppel.
Although in these various ways, the Courts have generally sought to avoid
connection with Lord Denning, and possibly in Gough v.Prase?7 might be seen as
taking some pains to distance itself from Cooke v. Head, there is perhaps
nonetheless a feeling, at least, that the approach suggested by Lord Denning in
that case might have some relevance, if not for determining the existence of an
31. And also apparently those of Australia after Allen v. Snyder, supra, though this decision may be
doubted after Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75.
32. See, e.g., Gough v. Fraser [1977] 1N.Z.L.R. 279, at p.286, where Cooke) expressed the finding of
the Court in these terms: "In the light of those findings and the terms of the documents themselves, I
think the case is one of the kind mentioned by Lord Diplock in Gissingv. Gissing ... there is an express
agreement between the parties as to their respective beneficial interests in land conveyed into the name
of one of them, an agreement which itself discloses the common intention required to create a
resulting, implied or constructive trust." But the common intention must relate to the property and be
more than "a common intention to share the responsibilities and pleasures of day to day living":
Sullivan v. Evans (1985) 3 N.Z.F.L.R. 449, 453 per Hardie BoysJ.
33. (1985) 3 N.Z.F.L.R. 506.
34. Ibid., at p.509
35. (1982) 1 N.Z.C.P.R. 454.
36. (1982) 3 N.Z.F.L.R. 119.
37. [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 279, see also and more particulady, Brown v. Stokes (1980) 1 N.Z.L.P.R. 209,
211-12 per Richmond P.
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equitable interest, then of the quantification of shares.38 More recently, perhaps
spurred by developments in Canada,39 the New Zealand Court of Appeal has been
inclined to recon~ider the concept of Lord Denning and the allied notion of unjust
enrichment. Perhaps this process started with the obiter comments of Cooke J in
Browne v. Stokes40 where, after stating that the Denning approach should be
regarded as open in New Zealand, he observed:
"In any resolution of the point in New Zealand it will be appropriate to
consider inter alia whether Lord Denning's approach is not more consistent
with the current and perhaps widely-accepted philosophy that the rights of a
partner to a union should not necessarily depend on whether it is a union in
law rather than de facto.,,4I
In the leading case of Hayward v. Giordani,42 although that case was actually
determined on the orthodox doctrine of common intention, Cooke J again
explored, obiter but with some apparent enthusiasm, the wider possibilities of
unjust enrichment and the Denning approach. This theme was continued in the
most recent case of Pasi v. Kamana43 in which he opined:
"In conducting that enquiry I respectfully doubt whether there is any
significant difference between the deemed, imputed or inferred common
intention spoken of by Lord Reid and Lord Diplock (and now by the English
Court of Appeal in Grant v. Edwards) and the unjust enrichment concept used
by the Supreme Court of Canada. Unconscionability, constructive or
equitable fraud, Lord Denning's 'justice and good conscience' and 'in all
fairness': at bottom in this context these are probably different formulae for
the same idea. As indicated in Hayward v. Giordani, I think we are all driving
in the same direction. ,,44
In the result in this case, however, neither common intention nor unjust
enrichment were found to be established where the parties, having established a de
facto relationship, moved into a house purchased by the man (Kamana) with the aid
of a sum obtained in settlement of a common law injury claim, and a mortgage, but
where the woman (pasi) had made no more than ordinary domestic contributions.
Because Cooke P, as he now is, has shown some interest in North American
models, as allied with the views of Lord Denning, and before considering further
38. Ibid at p.283, per Richmond P.
39. E.g., Pettkus v. Becker (1980) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257.
40. (1980) 1 N.Z.C.P.R. 209.
41. Ibid., at p.213, thus referring to the philosophy underlying the Matrimonial Property Act 1976,
which applies only to lawful marriages (see, supra, n.23).
42. [1983] N.Z.L.R. 140.
43. [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603.
44. Ibid., at p.205; see also the judgment of McMullin J (at p.607). Some support for this seems to be
growing in the High Court of Australia inMuschinskiv. Dodds (1984) 62 A.L.R. 429 and more recently
in Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76 A.L.R. 75, 88 per Toohey J.
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the elements in the new model trust based on common intention, it might be
pertinent and helpful to digress momentarily, to see if and how the amalgam of
common law jurisdictions which is the substantial part of the United States of
America, has approached similar problems.
The analogous American approach
In great measure the criticism of the Denning approach to the new model
constructive trust, has been that the approach is essentially American and
therefore foreign and different from the English approach. Thus Mahon J
observed:
"If, therefore, it is right to say that the constructive trust is now being used by
the English Court of Appeal as a general remedial device against unjust
enrichment, then one can only reply that such a course is a novel departure
from the accepted modes of restitution, and is also a departure from the
manner in which English Courts have treated the constructive trust as a legal
concept. In England the constructive trust is treated as a substantive principle
of liability normally imposed where a fiduciary relationship exists. The
American concept is different. The constructive trust in that jurisdiction has
merely the status of a procedural device to prevent unjust enrichment, and the
latter concept is the controlling principle pursuant to which the remedies of
quasi-contract and constructive trust and related equitable remedies together
operate.,,45
Such dismissal of American views of the constructive trust as something rather
irrelevant, certainly different, is perhaps a little unfair. Certainly there are
elements of great breadth in the American concept of constructive trust as a
remedy for unjust enrichment, yet often behind much judicial rhetoric may be
found examples similar to those familiar to jurisdictions within the orbit of the
House of Lords. The difference between the two approaches is perhaps more of
theory than absolute practice but may be more noticeable at the extreme limit of
the constructive trust doctrine. In between these extremes, English and American
cases seem to run parallel courses on like principles.46 The point, simply, is that
45. Avondale Printers and Stationers Ltd v.Haggie [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 124, 147; and see also A.J. Oakley,
Comlructroe Trusts 2nd. Ed. (1987), ppJ3 and 36. However see Baumgartner v. Baumgartner (1987) 76
A.L.R. 75, 87 where Toohey J noted this doctrine of unjust enrichment as a "Unifying legal concept."
46. In Biniom v. Evans [1972] 2 All E.R. 70, 76 Lord Denning had the audacity to cite a generalisation
made by Cardozo J in Beautty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co (1919) 225 N.Y. 380. Yet apart from the
rhetoric of that dictum, the decision was simply a case of breach of fiduciary relationships, and might
seem to rest happily with such English decisions as Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver [1942J 1 All E.R.
378 and more recently Is/and Export Finance Ltd. v. Umunna [1986] B.C.L.C. 460. Indeed the same
basic principles of breach of fiduciary relationship can be seen in the more recent decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in SntPP v. United Stales 444 U.S. 507 (1980), a case which is perhaps a shadow of the
"Spycatcher" controversy.
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because there are differences between the two systems of common law
jurisprudence, the similarities ought not to be dismissed.
So in point, perhaps, for the trusts of the new model arising particularly in the
familial context, are these words from a leading U.S. authority, Scott on Trusts,
illustrating that the approach may fundamentally be the same, though labelled as a
resulting trust:
"In determining whether the plaintiff has an enforceable claim, the courts
may apply the same principles that are applied in the case of married couples.
They will consider whether there was an agreement or understanding as to
how the property shoul~ be shared. They will consider the contributions that
the parties have made, directly or indirectly, to the purchase price of the
property acquired, and if this cannot be ascertained with any exactness may
award a half, or in some cases a third or other fractional interest. As in the
case where the parties are married, it is not fatal that the agreement, if any,
involves land and is oral. It is not to be expected that they should reduce their
agreement to writing. The technical rules as to consideration are not applied,
and at any rate the reliance of the one on the undertaking of the other involves
the situation of promissory estoppel.,,47
Perhaps this ought now to be followed up with a few illustrative decisions.
(i) Resulting trust
In Beal v. Beal the Supreme Court of Oregon held a resulting trust to existwhere
a woman and man lived together having jointly entered into a contract as husband
and wife to purchase land for $22,500. Of the $2,000 deposit, the man paid $500
and the woman the remaining $1,500. The balance of the purchase price was to be
paid in monthly instalments. All but the first were paid by the man before and after
the relationship ended. The woman's income however was used for family
expenses, and for those furnishings which were not otherwise paid for from the
joint savings account. It was held that there was evidence of an intention to pool
their resources for their common benefit and the common intention indicated that
the property was to be shared equally in equity, notwithstanding the
disproportionate cash contribitions to its purchase.
In the course of the judgment of the Court, Howell J said:
"We believe a division of property accumulated during a period of
cohabitation must be begun by inquiring into the intent of the parties, and if
an intent can be found, it should control the property distribution. While this
is obviously true when the parties have executed a written agreement it is just
as true if there is no written agreement. The difference is often only the
47. Supplement to Scott on Trusts, Ed. Fratcher (1987), p.347. As to the employment of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, see alsoMaharaj v. Chand [1986] 1 A.C. 898.
48. 577 P2d 507 (1978).
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sophistication of the parties. Thus absent an express agreement, courts
should closely examine the facts in evidence to determine what the parties
implicitly agreed upon.,,49
In Edwards v. Woods,sO a man and woman in a defaao relationship (often in U.S.
still termed a 'meretricious relationship') had to move from a shared apartment, on
the sale of the reversion, but the man used a coincidentally received accident
compensation cheque as a down payment on a house, legal title to which was put in
the woman's name. Having determined that no gift was intended in favour of the
woman all that remained was to quantify the shares. Harris J in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals defined a resulting trust as "a property relationship
designed to effectuate the parties' intent when a party takes title to property for
which another has furnished the consideration ... if the parties intended each to
have equal (or disproportionate) shares that intent should be recognised. As we
have said, a purchase money resulting trust is a means to enforce the parties'
intent. If their intent cannot be found a resulting trust must be recognised in
Edward's favour in the same proportion on the amount of consideration furnished
by him."Sl
In Car/son v. Car/son the facts were rather different. As part of a divorce
settlement, the former husband agreed to transfer his undivided half share in the
matrimonial property held as tenant in common with his wife, in consideration for
a waiver by her of her rights to alimony. Contemporaneously with this transfer of
the half share, the wife conveyed the whole to her husband, but continued to live in
the property and to pay outgoings on it, except the mortgage repayments which
were paid by the husband. It appears that the conveyance to the husband was
simply to prevent the property becoming subject to a lien for the wife's legal
expenses and was subject to an oral agreement for further reconveyance back to
the wife on request. Although these facts might suggest clearly a resulting trust
based simply on a voluntary conveyance on the old authority of Dyer v. Dyer and
that any question of intent is to be regarded simply for purposes of rebutting a gift
or advancement, it seems that the court, while appearing to recognise this, also saw
the general intent of the circumstances as going to the root of the resulting trust.
Thus Linn J giving the decision of the Appellate Court of Illinois said this:
"A resulting trust is created by operation oflaw from the presumed intention
of the parties. The intent of the parties is inferred from their conduct,
relationship,and surrounding circumstances ... If the proof discloses that the
,parties did not intend the conveyance as a gift, or advancement, equity will
effectuate the intention of the parties by declaring a resulting truSt."S3
49. Ibid., at p.51O.
50. 385 A2d 780 (1978)
51. Ibid., at pp.783-84.
52. 393 NE 2d 643 (1979).
53. Ibid., at pp.664-65.
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InJiminez v.Jiminez,54 the same court held, in an opinion delivered by RomitiJ,
that "if one spouse has directly contributed funds which have been used by the
other spouse to acquire property, the contributing spouse has an equitable claim to
a portion of the property", but that the court could give effect to an ante-nuptial
verbal agreement "to pool their money together in order to purchase real
property", and that such a verbal agreement was not affected by the Statute of
Frauds, if the agreement was fullyperformed by the party seeking to enforce it, as
it was held to be here, by the wife's contribution to the purchase funds. Further it
is suggested that the same would apply in the case of deftao relationships for,
"people who live together as man and wife without benefit of legal marriage may
still be bound by express or implied contracts between themselves relating to their
acquisition of property." The court in this case did not attempt to define or
categorise the trust found, in favour of the wife. It seems that the basis of the trust
was the resulting trust; hence the initial reference to contributions creating an
equitable claim. Yet the court seems to go beyond that form of trust in connection
with this oral agreement and by raising the issue of the Statute of Frauds, seems to
be importing an element of the constructive trust.
it) Or constrnaive trnst?
That the possibility that the solution to such familial disputes, or wherever the
courts are givingeffect to an actual agreement, or even an inferred agreement, may
alternatively be found not in the resulting, but in the constructive trust, is to a
degree recognised in the judgment in Beal v. Beal, which set out several
alternatives: "One approach taken by the Washington Supreme Court ... was to
hold that where a man and woman had lived together in a close familial type
relationship, the joint operations of a ranch created an implied partnership
agreement. Another approach has been to use either a resulting trust . . . or a
constructive trust.,,55
The same point is made in Orner v. Orner.56 In this case, before the Court of
Appeal of Washington, it was held that where property was taken in the name of
the defendant with the intent that the property would ultimately be shared by both
the plaintiff and defendant, the constructive trust remedies were appropriate even
though the relationship was meretricious, albeit only technically so, for the parties
had been married in Israel. However, the husband had initiated and directed
changes in the marital situation, and the parties had divorced so as to enter into
different, sham marriages solely for the purpose of obtaining U.S. citizenship.
Nonetheless they continued to regard themselves as married to each other, and to
live together until the 'husband' went to Washington state to build "a paradise" for
54.386 N E 2d 647 (1979), at p.649.
55. 577 P 2d 507, 509
56.523 P 2d 957 (1974).
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them. The 'wife' continued to live in New York but sent some or most of her
earnings to assist her husband's aims.57
Although these cases may be distinguished from those American cases
previously noted, and may seem more appropriately to be constructive trusts,
especially as the contributions were of a more general intent, aqd not directed to
the acquisition of specific property, there are, it is suggested, the same essential
elements:
(i) common intention, or implicit agreement;
(ii) acquisition of property pursuant to that intention;
(iii) contribution in cash also pursuant to the common intention;
and the categorisation of the consequent trust would seem to depend in general
upon a very nice distinction as suggested in a recent opinion of the Supreme Court
of Virginia.
"Resulting and Constructive trust comprise two categories of trust by
operation of law arising without any express declaration of trust. Thus
resulting trust arises where one person pays for property or assumes payment
of all or part of the purchase money, but has title conveyed to another with no
mention of a trust in the conveyance. Although a subsequent payment of or
promise to pay the purchase price will not create a resulting trust such a trust
arises when prior to purchase a person binds himself to pay the purchase
money and stands behind his commitment, but title is conveyed to another ...
Constructive trusts are those which the law creates independently of intention
of the parties to prevent fraud and injustice. While there is a distinction
between resulting and constructive trusts, albeit often difficult to determine,
the same remedial principles apply to both.,,58
(iii)Therefore a New Trust?
If the distinction is often difficult to determine, and the same remedial
principles apply to both, it may be attractive to suggest that any pretence at
distinction might now be eliminated. Indeed, perhaps thinking along the same line
as Lord Denning, the Colorado Court of Appeal made that precise suggestion. In
Page v. Clark,59 a case involving a conveyance of land, with the simultaneous but
oral agreement for reconveyance on request, the Court of Appeal opined that there
should be a single category of Equitable trust, "because the distinctions become
blurred", and in Colorado, "the dividing line between resulting and constructive
trusts has, in fact become transparent, many cases involving elements of both
57. Pearson CJ concluded (at p.961): "It is true, there is no specific finding of fraud or
misrepresentation or overreaching. There is however, a clear element of unconscionability inherent in
the findings of the trial Court which in our view, justifies applic,ationof the doctrine of constructive
trust."
58. Leonard v. Counts 272 S E 2d 190 (1980).
59.572 P 2d 1214 (1977).
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decided under the aegis of one ... Other decisions while alluding to both have
reached this result in such a way as to be traceable to neither." ... adding:
"In brief the 'conscience of equity' has become clouded by labels that are
difficult to pin down and discuss in a cogent manner ... We have therefore
determined to deal with this case and others like it based upon whether the
equitable responsibilities of the court require that a trust be decreed,
irrespective of how that trust is denominated. The underlying theories of
course remain unchanged. It is hoped that the emphasis which has hitherto
been placed on labels, instead of a relationship between the parties, will
diminish along with the very real possibility that appropriate relief may be
denied because the proof in a genuine case does not precisely fit one theory to
the exclusion of the other. We recognise that our de-emphasis of the
traditional labelling process runs counter to the advice of some commentators
who maintain without explanation that the distinction should be retained
intact, and that a blurring of the lines would yield an equitable result ... at
the expense of accurate legal theory ... We are constrained to observe, in
response, that equity had its birth in the unjust results that arose from the
rigid insistence of the law upon 'accurate legal theory' and that the value of
the accuracy or precision of a legal theory should be measured by whether its
application deals a just and equitable result.,,60
These suggestions were met, on appeal, by the Supreme Court6I in the manner
with which the similar viewsof Lord Denning have been met - with clear rejection
after a review of the authorities and the traditional distinctions between the two
classes of trust:
"Against this background, the error of the Court of Appeals in supplanting
the remedies made available through resulting and constructive trusts with an
'equitable trust' becomes apparent. The equitable remedies which the Court
of Appeals replaced have served the courts of this state for nearly a century.
These remedies have enabled the courts to prevent unjust enrichment for
nearly half a millenium ... The experience and precedent thus gained are not
lightly to be cast aside. The Court of Appeals cited no authority for its action
. .. [It] expressed the fear that a too rigid adherence to the prescribed
elements of constructive and resulting trusts could present a 'very real
possibility' that a deserving party would be denied relief, because he could not
fit his cause of action into the prescribed forms. Yet we have been referred to
no decision of the Court in which a deserving party has been denied equitable
relief because of a doctrinaire adherence to form. Rather the doctrines of
resulting and constructive trusts have proven to be extremely flexible.,,62
60. Ibid., p.l218.
61. 592 P 2d 729 (1979).
62. Ibid., p.799: see also the similar observation of Fox LJ inAshburn Amtalt v.Arnold [1988] 2 W.L.R.
706,725.
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From the foregoing sample, it may be possible to suggest that the American courts
are dealing with like problems in a substantially similar way to that of courts
elsewhere. Possibly even, the results may be seen as reasonably consistent with the
diaum of Lord Diplock and the spirit of Gissing v. Gissing. Thus whatever label
may be attached to the trust finallyheld to exist, the approach consists basically of
seeking some common intention, either express or inferred from contribution and
conduct, particularly conduct which puts one party at some detriment. Thus if one
or more parties to a relationship acquire property, the question is whether the
contributions, especially financial contributions, made by the other party, are made
pursuant to some intention. If so the beneficial interest will be apportioned
according to their perceived intention.
While the U.S. courts seem to have similar problems oflabelling, they do, if the
sample is, as is believed, typical, on the whole more easily distinguish between a
resulting trust and a constructive trust. Thus, the description of resulting trust
would be appropriate, if the contribution pursuant to the intention is more
specificallyreferable to the acquisition of particular property; whereas constructive
trust is better if the intention and contributions are more general, or if there is
some clear antecedent agreement. In passing, it might be observed that, in the
USA, the resulting trust seems to be regarded as more of a general intention trust,
than in the anglophile common law jurisdictions. In the latter, as will be shown, the
resulting trust is based on presumed intention, to be shared strictly in accordance
with cash contribution. Secondly, that presumed intention may be displaced and
rebutted by a contrary intention to increase the proportionate shares, or
alternatively to deny a trust at all. By focusing on a single intention of the parties,
gleaned from the circumstances, the American courts circumvent this double
process.63
While this may suggest a difference in the law, it is nonetheless submitted that
the essential features are the same as those required in other jurisdictions:
(i) the acquisition of property by one or some of the parties;
(ii) a shared intention, express or inferred, as to the beneficial ownership
(iii) some relevant contribution, principally financial, made by the non-titled
party, which is directly or indirectly referable to the acquisition.
The U.S. approach to the distinction may be one which, on the whole, appears
clear, but it is not necessarily that favoured in other courts where more traditional
definitions are maintained.
So having digressed, perhaps it is pertinent at this stage to look briefly at the
categories of resulting and constructive trust, to see how, bearing in mind the
apparent U.S. distinctions, the new model constructive trust, or the common
intention trust, stands measured against them.
63. It may be that in the cases of Edwards v. Woods, supra n.50, and Car/son v. Carlson, supra n.52, some
distinction seems preserved between the presumed intention of a bare resulting trust and the additional
intention for rebutting that presumption. Nonetheless, it seems to be the general approach that because
the one is a resulting trust, the further intention should be classified similarly.
67
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
(i) The resulting trust
The classic resulting trust emerges in two distinct forms possibly linked by the
common presumptions of intention. 64The first form which is not within the scope
of this article arises where an express trust fails, or fails to exhaust the beneficial
interest.65
The second form is, of course, pertinent. It arises where property is purchased
in the name of another. Perhaps the classic statement of such a trust is that of Eyre
CB in Dyer v.Dyer:66 "The clear result of all the cases without single exception is
that the trust of a legal estate, whether freehold, copyhold or leasehold; whether
taken in the names of the purchasers and others jointly, or in the name of others
without that of the purchaser; ... whether in one name or several, whether jointly
or successive, results to the man who advances the purchase money; ... and it
goes on a strict analogy to the rule of common law, that where a settlement is made
without consideration, the use results to the feoffor." Such principle has now
extended from land to other forms of property, and a more recent analysis of the
situations which give rise to this purchase money resulting trust have been
examined in Bateman Television Ltd. (in Liquidation) v. Bateman.67 In this case,
where cars were bought, substantially with company funds, but which were vested
and registered in the names of individual directors, Turner J in the N.Z. Court of
Appeal identified three situations where such a trust might arise:
"First there is the case in which A purchases a property with his own funds,
putting it in the name of B ...
The second class of cases is that in which A, using funds provided by B,
purchases, in the absence of B, a property, putting it in his own name. Here, if
the evidence is such that B, can be said to have advanced the money to A in
the charaaer of a purchaser, there will be a resulting trust; aliter, if the money
appears to have been advanced by him to A in the character of a lender.
There is a third class of case, perhaps the most common of all, where both
parties take part in the purchase, the funds or part of them being found by one
and the title being taken in the name of the other. On these facts without
more being proved a presumption arises that the advance was made 'in the
character of a purchaser', though the evidence may show that this was not so,
and that the advance was a loan, or partly a loan.,,68
Thus three situations are identified, to which may be added the voluntary
conveyance of property by its owner to another person. However, whatever form it
64. In Re VanderveJ/'s Trusts (No 2) [1974] 1Ch.269, 289-90 Megarry J seems to have doubted that the
two forms actually operate on the same principle.
65. Apparently also if an implied or constructive trust fails: Barclays Bank Ltd. v.Quistclose Investments
Ltd. [1975] A.C. 567.
I 66. (1788) 2 Cox Eq. 92, 93.
67. [1971] N.Z.L.R. 453.
68. Ibid., at p.462.
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takes essentially some or all of the consideration moves from one party, while the
title moves to another. In each case there is raised a presumption that the supplier
of the consideration intends no benefit to accrue to the title holder beyond what
that person has contributed personally to the acquisition of the title.
a) Contribution
Perhaps a typical case of the classic contribution and purchase money resulting
trust is the well-known case ofBull v. Bull, 69 where contribution by a mother to the
purchase price of a house vested in her son's name was held sufficient to give an
interest equivalent to the proportionate value of that contribution. However, the
question of contribution is limited to the purpose of acquiring property and the
resulting trust is consequently bound to the fact of acquisition. Only payments
which can be interpreted clearly as part of the consideration or capital outlay can
raise the presumption of resulting trust. Thus, in Savage v. Dunningham70
contribution to the rent payments, where a premium had been paid, did not raise a
resulting trust, for in such circumstances it was the premium not the rent service
which represented the capital for acquisition. The situation would be different
where no premium is paid for a lease or tenancy, but where the rent has the dual
purpose of rent-service and consideration, and the courts, it has been said, ought
to recognise the realities of the situation.71
It is the very realities of the situation which cause a small problem for calling the
new model trust, a resulting trust. The problem is that of indirect contribution.
Few people can, of course, these days purchase property, particularly residential
property, paying the full price in cash. Rather property is purchased with the aid of
a mortgage, which involves a lender paying outright the balance of the purchase
money, and the actual purchaser of the property repaying the loan over a period of
time. In practical terms the purchaser-mortgagor may regard the mortgage
repayments as a kind of glorified hire-purchase, that each instalment pays off the
purchase price, but as Mason and Brennan 11 opined in a joint judgment in
Calverley v. Green:
"It is understandable but erroneous to regard the payment of mortgage
instalments as payment of the purchase price of a home. The purchase price
is what is paid in order to acquire the property; the mortgage instalments are
paid to the lender from whom the money to pay some or all of the purchase
price is borrowed. In this case, the price was $27,250 of which $18,000 was
borrowed from the mortgagee by the plaintiff and defendant jointly ... They
mortgaged that property to secure the performances of their joint and several
obligation to repay principal and to pay interest. The payment of instalments
under the mortgage was not a payment of the purchase price but a payment
ti9. [1955] 1 QB. 234.
70. [1973] 3 W.L.R. 471.
71. Ma/lfYan Credit Ltd. v. Jack Chia Ltd. [1983] 1 All E.R. 711.
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towards securing the release of the charge which the parties created over the
property purchased."n
Quite dearly the resulting trust is tied to payment of the consideration of the
property, or contributions to that payment. While possibly there may be
circumstances in which a commitment, at the time of acquisition of the property, to
repay a loan will represent an appropriate contribution to the purchase price, and
even though some judges might regard the new model trust as essentially a
resulting trust, the extension to other indirect contributions as suggested in Lord
Reid's minority opinion in Pettitt73 seems to go beyond the simple concept of a
purchase price resulting trust. Hence in order to accommodate the realities of the
property acquisition situation the majority of judges appear to have moved in a
different direction, which can more confidently permit a variety of indirect
contributions to be made and considered, namely by considering them as evidence
of some common intention. The idea of common intention involves that of
agreement and as the two terms may be interchangeable74 essentially point to a
rebuttal of the basic resulting trust.75
If the resulting trust, as seems accepted in US and elsewhere, is designed to give
effect to an intention, it is generally a presumed intention only and is a rebuttable
presumption,74 which can be rebutted by either the reverse presumption of
advancement, or a contrary intention. 77
b) Rebutting the trust
This is a factor which cannot be overlooked. The resulting trust is presumed
because no other solution is appropriate. It is an act of Equity.
"Equity operates on conscience but is not influenced by sentimentality. When
a man (usually it is a man) purchases property and his companion (married or
unmarried, female or male) contributes to the purchase price, or contributes
to the payment of a mortgage, equity treats the legal owner as a trustee of the
property for himself and his companion in the proportions in which they
contribute to the purchase price because it would be unconscionable for the
legal owner to continue to assert absolute ownership unless there is some
express agreement between the parties, or unless the circumstances in which
the contributions were made established a gift or loan or some relationship
incompatible with the creation of a truSt.,,78
72. (1984) 56 A.L.R. 483, 493. Cf. Lord Templeman in Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co.
Ltd. [1987] 1 All E.R. 114, 116.
73. [1970] A.C. 777, 795; and also in Gissingv. Gissing [1971] A.C. 886, 897.
74. Apparently so used by Bagnall J in COIPcherv. Cowcher [1971] 1W.L.R. 425, 427-32.
75. Ibid., at p.432.
76. The exact degree of evidence needed to rebut the presumption may, of course, vary with the
circumstances of each case: Fowkes v. Pascoe, supra n.74, (1875) L.R. 10 Ch. App. 343.
77. E.g., COIPcherv. COIPcher,supra n.74, at p.432 and the cases noted in note 63, supra.
78. Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co. Ltd. [1987] 1All E.R. 114, 118per Lord Templeman.
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In this passage Lord Templeman clearly recognised that a resulting trust is
rebuttable, but suggests only two possible means of rebutting the presumption: a)
an agreement that the title owner is to have sole beneficial ownership; or b) which
probably amounts to the same thing, that the contribution is a gift or loan or is
otherwise "incompatible with a trust.,,79It may however, be suggested that further
alternative ways of rebutting a bare resulting trust are to show a different type of
trust was intended, or can be inferred from the common intention of the parties.
The idea of common intention, as the basis of the kind of trust of the new model
perhaps first appeared in Rimmer v. Rimmer,8o where it clearly arose to rebut the
proportionate purchase money resulting trust, and for which purpose it seems to
have been used since. Therefore, if there can be demonstrated an intention that,
instead of the share found simply and strictly on the exact proportion of monetary
contribution to purchase price of the property or an improvement to it, the various
contributors should get different or even eq':1alshares, then the resulting trust is
rebutted, for the intention presumed by equity is displaced. Thus in Muschinski v.
Dodds81 the High Court of Australia held explicitlythat a resulting trust of unequal
proportions was rebutted by evidence that it was the common intention of the
parties that the property should be held in equal shares. Gibbs CJ quite
unequivocally stated " ... the presumption that there is a resulting trust may be
rebutted by evidence that in fact the real purchaser intended that the other
transferee should take a beneficial interest.,,82
However, if common intention trusts of the new model can be viewed in one way
as arising out of a rebuttal of a bare resulting trust, to increase the proportionate
shares, it can only be so if there was a contribution made which would by itself
raise the presumption of resulting trust. Yet it is clear that the common intention
trust is more independent and can arise where no resulting trust could otherwise
be claimed. Thus in Eves v. Eves83 a de facto spouse was awarded a beneficial
interest in a home, despite the fact that she made no cash contribution. Leaving
aside Lord Denning's possibly controversial judgment in the case, it is clear that a
result in her favour might have been achieved through proprietory estoppel, yet the
matter was possibly resolved by common intention, based on their implied bargain
or agreement.
"If, however, it was part of the bargain between the parties, expressed or to be
implied, that the plaintiff should contribute her labour towards the reparation
of a house in which she was to have some beneficial interest, then I think that
79. For a recent example, see Annen v. Rattee (1985) I E.G.L.R. 136.
80. [195311 QB. 63.
81. (1984) 62 A.L.R. 429.
82. Ibid., at pp.431-32. Perhaps in a negative way this can also be illustrated by Beech v. Beech where,
although the case was ultimately decided on proprietory estoppel, the claimant might have relied on a
16% contribution to the purchase price for a 16% interest as a resulting trust. However no such claim
was made but a greater interest was sought on the basis of a common intention.
83. [1975] 3 All E.R. 768.
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the arrangement becomes one to which the law can give effect. This seems to
be consistent with the reasoning of the speeches in Gissing v. Gissing.,,84
Here the common intention or bargain could not rebut the resulting trust, because
without cash contributions, the presumption of such a trust could not be raised,
unless the idea of contribution were extended, a step which it seems the House of
Lords has not yet been prepared to countenance, and even the U.S. courts seem to
look first for cash contributions.
It is therefore suggested here that while the element in the new form of trust
which emphasises contribution is a development from resulting trusts, in part as a
rebuttal of the prima fade presumption, then unless the resulting trust is seen from
the apparent American perspective as a total intention-based trust, it goes beyond
that form of trust and operates as a more independent basis of trust.
(ii) Constructive trust
The classic denomination of the common intention trust employs also the label
constructive trust. This concept, as Fox LJ points out in Ashburn Anstalt v. Arnold,
"has proved to be highly flexible in practice",85 though it is perhaps not easy to
define, because its parameters are not clearly set. Such a trust is one which, it may
be obviously stated, is construed by the courts from the circumstances of the case,
and to this extent, the common intention trust, being so construed, may properly, if
pedantically, be called a constructive trust. However, in the main, the constructive
trust is imposed in a more limited range of cases, where a fiduciary is in breach of a
fiduciary relationship, or obtains some personal advantage from that relationship;
or a stranger to the trust knowingly assists a breach of trust, or receives trust
property. There is an element of equitable wrong doing, fraud, or "want of
probity",86 which is independent of intention. Equally, as illustrated by Phipps v.
Boardman,87 an intention to benefit the trust by a well meant excess of fiduciary
obligation will not prevent a constructive trust being imposed. Generally,
therefore, a constructive trust is independent of intention.88 Perhaps, while a
constructive trust can co-exist with some sort of intention, the need to establish
any intention to constitute such a trust is irrelevant. Therefore, it would seem to
follow that a trust wholly based on the establishment, expressly or by inference or
implication of an intention, especially a common intention ought not properly to be
labelled a constructive trust, if the categories of trust are to remain pure.
However, there is one class of case, usually recognised as a constructive trust,
which may have some relevance to the new model, common intention trusts. It has
therefore been held that a "constructive" trust arises where the legal owner of
84. Ibid., at p.774 per Brightman J.
85. [1988] 2 W.L.R. 706, 725; and see Page v. Clark 592 P2d 729 (1979).
86. Carl Zeiss Stifiung v. Herbert Smith and Co. [1969] 2 Ch. 276, 300 per Edmund Davies J.
87. [1967] 2 A.C. 46.
88. E.g., Re Hope (1985) 59 A.L.R. 609, 611 per Spender J; Leonard v. Counts 272 SE 2d 190 (1980);
. and Maitland, Equity (Ed. Brunyate, 1949), p.83.
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property seeks to assert an exclusive interest in denial of a prior but unenfOrceable
agreement or undertaking. Such a trust was found, of course, in Bannister v.
Bannister,89 where Scott LJ stated:
"It is, we think, clearly a mistake to suppose that the equitable principle on
which a constructive trust is raised against a person who insists on the
absolute character of a conveyance to himself for the purpose of defeating a
beneficial interest, which, according to the true bargain, was to belong to
another, is confined to cases in which the conveyance itself was fraudulently
obtained. The fraud which brings the principle into play arises as soon as the
absolute character of the conveyance is set up for the purpose of defeating the
beneficial interest, and that is the fraud to cover which the Statute of Frauds
or the corresponding provisions of the Law of Property Act, 1925, cannot be
called in aid in cases in which no written evidence of the real bargain is
available.,,90
Although the circumstances of this and other similar cases may be obviously
distinguishable from the recent familial-dispute trusts of the common intention
type, it may be possible to suggest an underlying likeness, in so far as both types of
cases depend on establishing initial agreement or understanding between the
parties at the time one of them acquired the property in dispute. So in Gissing v.
Gissing, Viscount Dilhorne observed:
"Where there was a common intention at the time of the acquisition of the
house that the beneficial interest in it should be shared, it would be a breach
of faith by the spouse in whose name the legal estate was vested to fail to give
effect to that intention and the other spouse will be held entitled to a share in
the beneficial interest.'>9l
The common intention - almost contractual
In the case of the Bannister type the existence of some antecedent agreement may
be clear, but in seeking for a common intention the courts are perhaps seeking a
similar sort of pact between the parties, albeit perhaps at a lower degree. It is clear'
from the cases following Pettitt and Gissing that the courts will give effect to an
express indication of intention and may imply an intention from the parties'
conduct but will not impute an intention. Thus Lord Diplock in Gissing made the
following observation:
"I did, however, differ from the majority of the members of your Lordships'
House who were parties to the decision in Pettitt v. Pettitt in that I saw no
reason in lawwhy the fact that the spouses had not applied their minds at all
89. [1948] 2 All E.R. 133.
90. Ibid., at p.136.
91 [1976] A.C. 886, 900.
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to the question of how the beneficial interest in a family asset should be held
at the time when it was acquired should prevent the court from giving effect
to.a common intention on this matter which it was satisfied that they would
have formed as reasonable persons if they had actually thought about it at that
time. I must now accept the majority decision that, put in this form at any rate,
this is not the law.,,92
In Pettitt, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest had expressed the law in these terms:
"Sometimes an agreement, though not put into express words, would be
clearly implied from what the parties did. But there must be evidence which
establishes an agreement before it can be held the one spouse has acquired a
beneficial interest in property which previously belonged to the other or has a
monetary claim against the other.,,93
Although these comments, and his later diaum that "there is no power in the court
to make a contract for the parties which they themselves have not made. Nor is
there power to decide what the court thinks that the parties would have agreed had
they discussed the possible breakdown or ending of their relationship", were given
in the context of 15.17of the Married Women's Property Act 1882, it has, it seems,
been developed to apply in equity to claims outside any such legislation.94
What this seems to suggest is that the courts are first seeking to ascertain the
existence of an agreement, whether expressed in terms of common intention or
otherwise. Hence, the courts look first for express agreement, and only if that is
absent do they look to the contributions and conduct of the parties to establish
first, the existence of the agreement and secondly, the nature or extent of that
agreement. If an agreement is established by either means it would then be a fraud
or breach of faith for the party with the legal title to deny that intent. In seeking,
where necessary, to imply an agreement from circumstances and the contributions
and the conduct of the parties, the courts may perhaps be said to be adopting a
back-working process similar to that by which a contract is established from acts of
part performance. "You must look first at the alleged acts of part performance and
see whether they prove that there must have been a contract and it is only if they do
so prove that you can bring in the oral contract.,,95
The nub of the decision in Steadman v. Steadman is perhaps most clearly set out
in the headnote.
92. Ibid., p.904.
93. [1970] A.C. 777, 804, whether the agreement is reached at the time of acquisition or subsequently.
The courts cannot impute an agreement or intention, but on the other hand Lord Pearson at p. 902 uses
the word "imputed." Lord Denning frequently used that word: e.g., Cookev. Head [1972] 1 W.L.R. 518,
520. See also Brown v. Stokes (1980) 1 N.Z.C.P.R. 209, 213 per Cooke J.
94. "The Court cannot devise arrangements which the parties never made. The court cannot ascribe
intentions which the parties in fact never had": per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Gissing v. Gissing
[1971] A.C. 886, 898.
95. Steadman v. Steadman [1974] 2 All E.R. 962, per Lord Reid.
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"In order to establish facts amounting to part performance it was necessary
for a plaintiff to show that he has acted to his detriment and that the acts in
question were such as to indicate on a balance of probabilities that they had
been performed in reliance on a contract with. the defendant which was
consistent with the contract alleged."
While the doctrine of part performance is more curtailed than the parallel
doctrine in relation to oral proof of a trust (and the speeches of the House of Lords
in both Pettitt and Gissing clearly show that these cases are based on trust not
contract),96 it is submitted that what these cases really show, is that the courts are
really enforcing a kind of informal and perhaps unvoiced contract to create a trust
whereby a beneficial interest is, by joint agreement and intention, to he held for
one or more cestuis que trust. It is, of course, not a contract to dispose of the legal
title to land per se, though that itself might create a trust of the vendor-purchaser
type. Hence, perhaps, the similarities being such, that in the seminal California
decision inMaroin v.Maroin97 the court sought to find an agreement between the
parties, and settled the issue of beneficial interests on the basis of an implied
contract, without rejecting the possible co-existence of other equitable or legal
remedies. In giving the opinion of the Supreme Court in Bane, Tobriner J
observed:
"In summary, we base our opinion on the principle that adults who voluntarily
live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent as
other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property rights ... 98
As we have explained, the courts now hold that express agreements will be
enforced unless they rest on a meretricious consideration.99 We add that in
the absence of an express agreement, the courts may look to a variety of other
remedies in order to protect the parties' lawful expectations ... The Courts
may inquire into the conduct of the parties to determine whether the conduct
demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership or
joint venture ... , or some other tacit understanding between the parties. The
courts may,when appropriate, employ the principles of constructive trust ... ,
or resulting trust ... Finally, a non-marital partner may recover in quantum
meruit for the reasonable value of household services rendered ... 1
96. E.g., Lord Pearson in Gissing at p.902. Although in a very limited and general sense the terms
contract, bargain, agreement or undertaking can be used with a degree of interchangeability, there is
perhaps one important distinction between legal notions of contract, and equitable ideas of trust (or
agreement to create a trust). While the latter may not exclude the former, the law tends towards an
objective "reasonable person" test, equity towards a subjective "party-based" test. So in Gissing the
House of Lords, specifically rejected the former as inappropriate for the new model, common intention
trust.
97. 557 P 2d 1065 (1976).
98. Ibid., p.116.
99. The consideration inMarvin v.Marvin was that Michelle Marvin had given up a lucrative career on
the strength of the agreement; see alsoTannerv. Tanner [1975] 3 All E.R. 776.
1. 557 P 2d 106 122-23.
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But the contract must be seen perhaps as one to create beneficial interests in
land. As previously pointed out the contract is not to dispose of land, but to
establish beneficial interests which the law of trusts can enforce. Hence, the
parties must, before the courts can enforce a trust against one, have been initially
ad idem in their common intention, and there must be some consideration for the
agreement, or at least something more than a merely gratuitous intention.2
Express trust or constructive trust
Put in this way, there may in the final analysis be seen to be little difference
between a trust found to exist as a result of the common agreement or intention of
the parties, and that in cases where in other circumstances the courts enforce an
oral agreement for a trust despite the Statute of Frauds or its more recently
enacted equivalent.3
It has been observed that the new model common intention trust does not need
to be proved in writing,4 but it may not be clear whether this is because it is in the
constructive trust exemptions or because simply, as has been long held, it would be
a fraud to deny the express trust. In Bannister v. Bannister and subsequently, the
two notions may have merged, but perhaps one may question even now whether
the trust in such case was really a constructive trust despite its being almost
universally given that description.
In Bannister one of the cases to which Scott LJ referred, and which has been the
basis of such constructive trust decisions as Hodgson v. Marks,6 was that of
Rochefoucauldv. Boustead7 in which there was simply an oral agreement or common
intention that one party would acquire land to be held on trust for another, which
could, to prevent a fraud, be proved by parol evidence. The Court in Rochefoucauld
held, on the basis of the classification laid down in Soarv.Ashwell,8 that the trust so
established by parol was in fact an express trust.
"The trust is one which both plaintiff and defendant in~ended to create. This
case is not one in which an equitable obligation arises although there may
have been no intention to create a trust. The intention to create a trust existed
from the first.,,9
Might not the same be said of our new model common intention trust? Perhaps
there may be a lesser degree of formality of agreement. Perhaps the intention is
2. Austin v. Keele (1987) 72 A.L.R. 579 (p.c.).
3. Law of Property Act 1925 (UK), s.53; Property Law Act 1952 (N.Z.), s.49A, as inserted by
Property Law Amendment Act 1980, s.2.
4. E.g., Gissing v. Gissing, supra n.73, at p.905 per Lord Diplock; also Hayward v. Giorlumi [19831
N.Z.L.R. 140, 144 per Cooke J.
5. Law of Property Act 1925 (UK), s.53(2); Property Law Act 1952 (N.Z.), s.49A(2).
6. [1971] Ch. 892.
7. [1897] 1 Ch. 196.
8. [1893] QB. 390.
9. [1897] 1 Ch. 196,208 per Lindley LJ.
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implied, but it cannot, as we are told, be imputed; and, though not creating a trust
per se, but a beneficial interest (surely much the same thing), that intention, by
agreement or common intention, existed from the first (or arose by new agreement
at a later date), so as to create a like trust.
Possibly, however, there remains a distinction between what might be called
true express trust, and intention trusts of the new model:
"While it is true that no particular form is necessary for the creation of an
express trust, the intention of the settlor to create a trust must be explicit. In
every case it is a question of fact for the court to determine whether an
intention to create a trust is sufficiently evinced.10
So as in Goodman v. Gallant,11 if the agreement employs the terminology of
trust, there will be an express trust, leaving only the precise quantification of
shares to be determined according to an expressed or implied common intention;
whereas on the other hand, if there is no like agreement, or one has to be implied
then, possibly, there is not an express trust but some other category. Thus, it may
be that the concept of express trust is limited to cases where a trust is deliberately
imposed upon property in reasonably explicit terms, all the three certainties being
present - in fact where the settlor, as owner of the property, understands that a
trust is being created. As Oakley puts it: "An express trust arises whenever a
settlor either declares that he is holding property on trust for another or transfers
property to another to hold in trust for a third party or for himself." 12Or as
Spender J put it in Re Hope: "An expressed trust is one in which there is an
expressed common intention by the parties as to the existence of the trust." 14
Possibly this may be a fine distinction that an express trust must in every case also
be exclusivelyan explicit trust despite the fact that no specific formula is needed.15
However, the House of Lords, at least, in Gissing v. Gissing seems to have stressed
that an express agreement is the best evidence of common intention,16 and only if
that is lackingwill the courts go through the process of sifting the evidence for any
. implication of an agreement, and performance of that implied agreement. Either
way it seems that the end result is the same degree of agreement - the same
common intention which is being proved.
Otherwise, there perhaps has to be faced, a distinction between three
fundamentally similar trusts:
10. Bloch v. Bloch (1981) 37 A.L.R. 55, per Wilson J.
11. [1986] Pam. 106.
12. Construaive Trusts 2 Ed. (1987), p.17.
13. (1985) 59 A.L.R. 609.
14. Ibid., at p.611 and see RochejOucauld v. Boustead, supra n.7(2).
15. Cj Re Kayford Ltd. (in liquidation) [1975] 1W.L.R. 279, where a deliberate intention was conceived
in relation to personalty. On the other hand the trust of the bank in Lyus v. Prowsa Developments Ltd.
[1982] 1W.L.R. 1044, though called a constructive trust, might justly be also interpreted as an express
trust - being tantamount to a clear declaration of trust.
16. E.g., per Lord Diplock at p.905.
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a) explicit trusts, where there is a conscious and deliberate intention to create a
trust;
b) express and/or explicit agreements (or contracts) to confer some beneficial
interest, but without a knowing thought of trust; and
c) trusts arising from a common intention not imputed, but based on evidence
which shows that the parties aaually had an intention to share the beneficial
interests in appropriate proportions.
The first two classes might be termed express trusts, the third constructive only,
though essentially it is based on the same actuality, merely proved in a different
way. Furthermore, it would seem from Gissing v. Gissing that the second and third
classes are to be treated as basically alike.
Therefore a distinction based on formalities seems somewhat artificial, and may
not hold. Indeed in Delahunt v. Carmod/7 the High Court of Australia seems to
have held that an oral agreement to share the property but not in terms to create a
trust could constitute an express trust. In this case, it was found that the parties
had contributed equally to the purchase of property, on the basis of an express oral
agreement that theywould own the property in equal shares and that it would in due
course be put in the names of both. However, Gibbs CJ commented cautiously:
"It does not matter whether the trust in the present case be regarded as an
express trust (not created by an instrument) or a resulting trust, for, as will be
seen, the result will be the same in either case."IB
Consideration - the role of proprietory estoppel
In Gissing v. Gissing Lord Diplock mentioned that some evidence of common
intention might be found in the fact that the non-owning spouse acted to his or her
detriment in reliance upon the alleged common intention.19 Recently, as has
previously been noted, much has been made of the apparent parallel between this
idea, and the doctrine of proprietory estoppel,20and indeed that doctrine has been
the backstop, in some cases, where no common intention to create a trust was
found.21However, proprietory estoppel, does not seem to require an intention. It
is established by simple proof of the expenditure of money upon the land of
another in a mistaken belief in some right, which mistake is known to the owner of
17. (1986) 69 A.L.R. 253.
18. Ibid., at p.225. Perhaps it could be argued that where pursuant to a common intention or
agreement, one party acquires the land, the other might alternatively claim an express trust on the
principle expressed by Lord Birkenhead LC in Les Affreteurs Reunis Societe Anonyme v. Leopold Walford
(London) Ltd. [1919] A.C. 801, 806.
19. Supra n.73, at p.905.
20. Grant v. Edwards [1986J 1 Ch. 638, per Browne-Wilkinson VC at p.656.
21. E.g., Beech v. Beech (1982) 1 N.Z.C.P.R. 454 and J. N EJ/iott and Co. v. Murgatroyd (1982) 3
N.Z.F.L.R. 119.
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the land.22 It results in the mistaken spender receiving an appropriate interest in
the land, whether an estate interest,23 an easement24 or a licence.25 Therefore, it
seems to differ in principle from trust, though it is clearly very similar in practice.
Certainly, in some cases the result may be reached on proprietory estoppel by a
process using the same evidential data, and similar implications, but it would seem
to be a separate, and possibly a floating, doctrine, which may achieve an
appropriate result where a trust fails or where perhaps the bargain cannot be
sufficiently clearly proved or implied. However, this is not to deny that estoppel or
something very like it does not form part of the process of establishing a trust
based on common intention.
If, as has been suggested, that trust is founded ort principles analagous to an oral
agreement or contract to create a trust, then for the trust to be enforceable it must
be completely constituted by an appropriate transfer, as perhaps in Goodman v.
Gallant,26 or the relevant alleged cestuis que trust must have provided appropriate
consideration; hence the need to ascertain th~ financial contributions made by that
person, or whether any other form of detriment has been suffered, as perhaps
Janet Eves' exertions in Eves v. Eves,27 or the giving up of some valuable right as in
Marvin v. Marvin28 or Tanner v. Tanner.29
In this way it may be that the consideration is provided by a similar detriment to
that required for an estoppel, so that the trust agreement becomes enforceable and
the claimant under the common intention ceases to be a mere volunteer. As
pointed out by the Privy Council in Austin v. Keele,3o a merely gratuitous intention
is insufficient to found a trust, of at least the common intention type. Possibly the
role of estoppel in the formation of such a trust, is simply to provide the necessary
consideration. The point may perhaps be illustrated by the decision of Gresson J
in the New Zealand Supreme Court in Thomas v. Thomas:31
"It is trite law that there is no equity to perfect an imperfect gift: and what the
husband did may seem, viewed superficially, to be an incomplete gift. He did
22. The fiveprobanda established in Willmott v.Barber (1880) IS Ch. 0.96, that: a) the claimant made
a mistake of legal rights; b) had spent money, or otherwise acted detrimentally on the faith of that
mistake; c) that the legal owner of the land knew his own rights as being inconsistent with the
claimant's; d) legal owner must know of the claimant's belief; e) legal owner must have encouraged the
claimant in his expenditure: have, in the course of time been relaxed so that only three, mistaken belief,
expenditure and knowing encouragement, need be shown: AndrerJJsv. Colonial Mutual Lift Assurance
Society Ltd. [1982] 2 N.Z.L.R. 556. .
23. Dillwyn v. Llewellyn (1862) 4 DeG. F & J 517; Beech v. Beech (1982) 1 N.Z.C.P.R. 454.
24. Crabb v. Arun District Council (1975) 32 P.C.R. 70.
25.}. N. Elliott fS Co. v.Mulgatrrryd (1982) 2 N.Z.F.L.R. 119; and perhaps the estoppel will extend the
effect of a licence into something almost approximating an interest in land: Plimmer v. Mayor etc. oj
Wellington (1884) 9 App. Cas. 699 (P.C).
26. [1986] Fam. 106.
27. [1975] 3 All E.R. 768.
28. 557 P 2d 106 (1976).
29. [1975] 3 All E.R. 776.
30. (1987) 72 A.L.R. 579.
31. [1956] N.Z.L.R. 785.
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not purport to constitute himself a trustee for her but to make over the
property to her; and he did not adopt the method appropriate for transferring
realty. Though equity will not assist volunteers, nevertheless there can be
circumstances in which an uncompleted gift of land can be binding."
In this case a husband and wife purchased land, in 1948, as joint tenants, with the
intention of building a matrimonial home, which was evidently completed. The
building costs were paid in cash provided mostly by the wife with most of the
balance being raised on a mortgage. In 1952, however, the husband left the
premises never to return, and as the judge found, orally abandoned his interest in
the property to his wife. Subsequently, she paid all mortgage instalments and other
financial outgoings, and sought the vesting of the property in her name alone. It
was held that the circumstances revealed a clear equity in Mrs Thomas' favour. So
presumably, the husband held his legal title as a trustee for her, but not perhaps an
explicit trust, but from the circumstances of the gift one which was intended as an
express gift, and so express trust.
Clearly, in Thomas the consideration which served to raise the wife's status from
that of a mere volunteer was financial, but there is perhaps no reason to suppose
that the principle does not apply to any other detriment suffered.
Conclusion
The object of this article has been to consider within the pantheon of trusts the
appropriate place of what has been called "the constructive trust of a new model"
or a common intention trust. Glass JA posed the question: "Is it a new kind of
constructive trust, an express trust or a resulting trust?,,32He might have added: or
a completely novel species of trust? In the course of the examination, this article
has perhaps fallen into two broad parts. In the first it was sought to establish, in
brief, the salient features of this modem form of trust, noting its development
especially by Lord Denning towards what seemed to some an unacceptably wide
doctrine; and seeking the analagous treatment in the different common law
jurisdictions of New Zealand and the U.S.A.. Possiblywhat was illustrated in this
first part was that there was a tension in the law; there are, on the one hand, those
judges who seem to want to avoid the precise niceties of form - that whether it is
called one name or another, as Gibbs CJ suggested, for example, in Delahunt v.
Cannody,33 the result might be the same. Ranged against this view, is the
alternative, that, as Bagnall J expressed it, the progeny must be legitimate,34 that
the Courts of Equity must develop along established lines.
There is, however, as suggested, potential hazard in this confusion or lack of
exactitude. The peril arises where a statute, say a statute of frauds or of
32. (1977) 2 N.S.w.L.R. 685, 689.
33. (1986) 68 A.L.R. 253.
34. Cowcher v. Cowcher [1972] 1W.L.R. 425, 430.
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limitations35applies differently to one form of trust than to another or where some
other statutory consequence has to be avoided. For example, might not the
distinction between one kind of estoppel and another have become blurred or even
eliminated as a result ofMaharaj v. ChantP.36 Might not the distinctions between
the classes of trusts be similarly indistinct?
Therefore, in the second part of the article, the essential features of traditional
forms of trust were noted briefly. Does the new trust relate to all or any? The
suggested answer is that it does or can be made to. But, equally, it does not do so
exactly. It is, of course, a contributing trust and the beneficial interest will relate to
the contribution made. However, the resulting trust has been established on
limited grounds of capital contributions ab initio. So unless the nature of the
contribution is to change, as the courts seem to have been unwilling to allow, the
common intention trust goes beyond the resulting trust. It is, as suggested earlier,
but a form of rebutting such a trust, although with some independent existence.
Unless, as apparent in America, the dynamic of intention supplants the notion of
presumption,37 there is no resulting trust category to hold completely the common
intention trust. It might further be suggested that where some cash contribution to
capital has been made, if the common intention fails there may remain a resulting
trust from the contribution alone.38
A second possibility is that this really is a form of constructive trust, based on the
kind of fraud in Bannister v. Bannister.39 However, if in common with such
constructive trust, the new model is based on breach of faith in asserting title
contrary to an earlier agreement, and like those constructive trusts, the basis of the
present is an agreement, a common intention, a contract to create a trust or
beneficial intent, there appears a conflict with the earlier forbear: Rochefoucauld v.
Boustead.4o The trust should perhaps be seen as a species of express trust. The
basis for this for both the express trust of Rochefoucauld, and the new model trust is
that expressly or by implication an intention ad idem between the parties is not
found to exist. Thus in Baumgartner v. Baumgartner41 a couple lived in a de [adO
relationship and some time later the man (appellant) purchased land and built a
house as their home. This land was bought in his name partly from the sale of the
property previously owned by him, prior to the start of the relationship, and partly
35. Perhaps it was the Limitations statute which, after all, influenced the result in RocJlefoucau/d v.
Boustead (]897] ] Ch. ]96.
36. (]986] ] A.C. 898. ]n this case it seems that the Privy Council employed the notion of promissory
estoppel, instead of proprietory estoppel, to evade the consequences of a Fijian statute.
37. Phraseology suggested by Megarry J in Re Vandervel/'s Trosts (No.2) (]974] ] Ch. 269, 289-90 and
see Calver/ry v. Green (]984) 56 A.L.R. 483, and especiallyper Murphy J at p.498.
38. Edwardv. Woods 385 A 2d 780 (]978); and see Bloch v. Bloch (]98]) 37 A.L.R. 55, where in the
absence of finding a common intention, there was nonetheless a resulting trust corresponding to the
capital contributions of the parties. From the case it may be suggested that the essence of an express
trust is the degree of certainty of the intention, whether common or otherwise.
39. (]948] 2 All E.R. 133.
40. (]897] ] Ch. ]96.
41. (]987) 76 A.L.R. 75.
81
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
by a mortgage in his own name. The purchase of the land was apparently discussed
by both parties together, although it seems to have been undertaken at his
initiative. It further seems that the woman had aspirations that the relationship
might result in marriage and it appears they may have discussed putting the home
in their joint names. There was also some evidence that throughout the
relationship they pooled their earnings in a common fund, though their
contributions were unequal and from this pool the mortgage instalments were
paid. However, the Court found that the evidence of subjective common intention
was doubtful, although admitting that the case was "borderline", the main
difficulty being the time the discussion took place. However, if a trust based upon
common intention failed the court, nonetheless, considered that such was the
nature of the relationship that a constructive trust might be imposed:
"In this situation the appellant's assertion, after the relationship had failed,
that the Leumeah property, which was financed in part through the pooled
funds, is his sole property, is his property beneficially to the exclusion of any
interest at all on the part of the respondent, amounts to unconscionable
conduct which attracts the intervention of equity and the imposition of a
constructive trust at the suit of the respondent.,,42
In conclusion it has been sought to be shown in this article that the common
intention trust, the so-called "Implied Resulting or Constructive trust" or the New
Model trust does not fit neatly, even by development, into the established
categories of resulting or constructive trust. Rather, it almost inevitablypoints to a
kind of express trust. If the focus is placed on those features in the new model
which are similar to those found in resulting or constructive trusts, for example the
contribution or the fraud, the essential nature of the trust becomes distorted, just
as to focus on the contractual nature of the agreement (though this analogy may to
a certain degree be helpful) is to risk the application of an objective rather than a
subjective approach to common intention. Clearly the theme of Gissingv. Gissing is
to stress the latter exclusively.What may have been revealed as the various classes
of trust, and the judicial approaches to parallel situations, have been catalogued in
the foregoing pages, is that not only may the common intention trust not fit
sufficiently an existing category of non-express trust, but that there is a confusion
and uncertainty of nomenclature and hence of the rules to be applied. The
confusion may, however, clear if it is emphasised that the essential bedrock of the
new trust is agreement or common intention, express or understood, whatever
other features may co-exist. The trust lies in agreement, not in the process by
which the agreement is proved, not in the consideration given or performed
whereby the cestui que trust ceases to be a volunteer. Neither does it lie in the
remedy by which the underlying trust is enforced.
The error of the court in Allen v. Snyder, as suggested by the decision in
42. Ibid., at p.84: the joint judgment of Mason C), Wilson and Deane)J.
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Baumgartner, was perhaps to fail to observe that the common intention trust was
essentially different from a constructive trust (or it might be added the resulting
trust or proprietory estoppel): that the latter could be considered if the former
failed. However, if this in itself is not sufficient to point to the common intention
trust being an express trust, it may also be suggested that hitherto there may have
been some confusion of the underlying trust with its remedy.
It is submitted that no essential difference exists between the trust by agreement
or undertaking or common intention, and the trusts in either RochejOucauld v.
Boustead or Bannister v. Bannister. All depend on an initial agreement. However, in
RochejOucauld, the trust was called express; in Bannister, constructive. While it may
be that Bannister appears as an anomalous constructive trust, the two cases may be
reconciled. The former may be said to focus on the original underlying trust,
whereas the latter looks to the remedy for its breach. Thus, it may be that the
confusion and the problem of name can be solved by asserting that where there is
some agreement or common intention this creates an express but not explicit trust,
which is enforceable by someone who is not a volunteer despite the absence of
writing, for to do otherwise would be to perpetrate a fraud. The fraud, however,
suggests not the trust or its nature, but its remedy. If the trustee breaks the trust or
denies its existence that fact may raise a constructive trust in a remedial sense. The
underlying trust nonetheless remains an express trust arising from agreement.
Clearly this is how, often, a constructive trust arises where a trustee commits a
breach of trust or excess of duty, or where a stranger knows of an antecedent
breach of trust. An express trust may first exist, the constructive trust follows as a
remedy.
In summary it may be suggested that the proper arrangement of degrees of trust
are:
a) a trust based on common intention or, if that fails to be proved,
b) either a resulting or constructive trust according to the circumstances, and,
c) if the common intention trustee (or co-trustee) breaks that trust or seeks to
deny it, that as with any other express trustee in like circumstances, the remedy
may be the imposition of a constructive trust. 43
The final conclusion is therefore, that the new model is not a resulting or
constructive trust as those terms have been generally understood, but perhaps is a
species of express trust. If, however, because of the process ofimplication involved
so often in this new model trust, the term 'express trust' feels inappropriate, and
given that the term 'implied trust' is frequently used as synonymous with resulting
trust,44 there is the alternative that there has developed a new species of trust
43. Possibly illustrated by Protheroe v. Protheroe [1968] 1 W.L.R. 519. If this case can be viewed as a
common intention trust (with a resulting trust in the background arising specifically from contribution)
then the application of Keech v. SandfOrd (1726) Sel. Cas. Ch. 61 would seem appropriate to such an
express trustee; and consistent with Phipps v. Boardman [1967] 2 A.C. 46.
44. See Maxton, Nevill's Law of Trusts, Wills and Administration in New Zealand (1985), p.52. Cf Pettit,
Equity and the Law of Trusts 6 Ed. (1989), 54.
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distinct from, but drawing its parameters from, features of each of the earlier
forms, and perhaps in the process of replacing them. Acknowledging that the new
model trust may be a kind of express trust does not perhaps inhibit further
development of a wider constructive trust to apply legislative philosophy as found
in the Matrimonial Property Act 1975 (NZ) to the law of trusts. The ultimate
alternative is to suggest, with the Colorado Court of Appeals,45that if and when
the label becomes important, that will depend on the whim of the particular court:
a situation which must be open to the same criticism Mahon J vented upon the
view of Lord Denning.46 This, it is submitted, would only exacerbate the already
existing confusion.
45.572 P 2d 1214 (1977), supra n.55.
46. Supra n.16.
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